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This article examines the policy responses of Western countries in the realm of asylum. We
begin by explaining the reasons why the asylum issue has made its way up the political
agendas of liberal democratic countries in recent years. While applications for asylum have
risen in the last two decades, we also highlight the way rights-based constraints and
financial costs have contributed to controversy around the issue. We then examine in detail
the major policy responses of states to asylum, grouping them into four main categories:
measures aiming to prevent access to state territory, measures to deter arrivals, measures to
limit stay, and measures to manage arrival. Moving then to explore the efficacy of these
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of four new directions in which policies could move in order better to square the professed
interests of Western states with the needs of refugees for protection.
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1 Introduction
For much of the post-war period, asylum and immigration were distinct concepts and
processes. Throughout the west, asylum was bound up with the Cold War: ‘protection’
meant protection from Communism, and the terms refugee and defector were
synonymous. When the public thought about refugees, to the extent it thought about
them at all, it associated them with Hungarian freedom fighters or Soviet ballet dancers,
both of which were popular figures. As for immigration, it meant different things in
different countries: in the settler societies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, it was
a permanent movement of people who sought to try their luck in the new world. In the
traditional emigration countries of Europe, it referred to the putatively temporary
movement of guestworkers who were expected to feed the European economic machine
for a few years before returning home. The important point is that, in both cases, the
two movements were everywhere separate.
In the last two decades, they have merged. This fusion is most complete in Europe,
where politicians and the public speak of ‘immigration’ and ‘asylum seeking’
interchangeably. Where immigration becomes politicized and subject to far-right
exploitation, as it has in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Italy, asylum seekers are
the focus of this hostility. Other contributors to this volume focus on why immigration
has folded into asylum; in this paper, we focus on how politicians have responded to
this development. Our focus is on Northern countries in general – Western and Central
Europe, the US, Canada and Australasia – but we accord somewhat disproportionate
attention to the countries of the European Union (EU). The justification for this focus is
two-fold: first, it is in these countries that the intermingling of asylum and immigration
is most complete; and, second, EU member states have gone furthest in coordinating
their policies in order to restrict access to asylum.
Observers of asylum in Europe have interpreted hostility to asylum as hostility
immigration  tout court. This represents a misunderstanding; in fact, all European
countries have expanded access for primary immigrants at the same time as they have
sought to reduce asylum applications. One way of interpreting this two-fold
development is as an effort to sustain the distinction between the two movements while
maintaining control over both: nation states, not only in Europe but particularly in
Europe, are attempting to retain the capacity to limit asylum seekers’ entry, and they are
resisting the conclusion that asylum is a form of uncontrolled immigration. In all
likelihood, they will fail. As we illustrate in the first section, EU member states have
restricted access to asylum as much as they can while still respecting the 1951 Geneva
Convention and their own national constitutions. Indeed, in some instances they have
violated the spirit if not the letter of both. Despite these efforts, asylum applications
remain high by post-War standards, and there is no let up in the pressures that fuel them.
Indeed, north/south wealth disparities and continuing violence and stability mean that, if
anything, they may increase. At the same time, legal, moral and practical restraints
mean that only a fraction of asylum seekers whose applications are rejected are
returned; deportation is not an effective policy tool for combating asylum. These two
developments, combined with asylum seekers’ difficulty in adapting to western labour
markets and restrictions on their right to work, lead to sharply increasing costs, above
all in Europe.2
The result is that in most Western countries asylum applications are at levels where they
generate deep political controversy and are likely to remain there; that public policy
reform has generally not enabled states to reduce these numbers and is not likely to in
the future; and that the costs associated with asylum rise with non-return and non-
(labour market) incorporation. Moreover, even those few states that have seen rates of
asylum seeking drop in recent years (such as Germany and the US) can, we will argue,
have little confidence that their success in taming asylum flows will continue. After
developing these arguments, we turn in the last section to outline possible paths future
asylum policy might take.
2 Context: the politicization of asylum
Since the 1980s, there has been a proliferation of asylum policy reforms designed to
reduce, deter and rationalize asylum claims and processing. Few if any policymakers in
the 1970s would have predicted the complex battery of asylum measures, and their
emergence requires explanation. The short and easy answer is numbers: as asylum
applications increased in the late 1980s, and skyrocketed in the early 1990s,
policymakers sought ways to reduce them. A sharper answer requires explaining two
aspects of the change: why did numbers increase so sharply, and why did states view
high numbers as so undesirable? The latter is less obvious than it might seem, as
Canada, the US and Australia define themselves as countries of immigration, and
Northern Europe welcomed millions of unskilled migrants in the 1950s and 1960s.
The root causes of increased asylum applications can only be examined briefly, but five
developments were crucial:
•   In 1967, a Protocol was added to the UN Convention on Refugees expanding
the application of the Convention to refugees who emerged as a result of events
occurring after 1951 and came from countries outside Europe (Suhrke 1997:
218-219).
•   The spread of film, television and telecommunications made differences in
income, employment and lifestyles across countries better advertized than ever
before, while cheaper transcontinental transport made mass movement possible.
•   By the early 1970s, France, Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia and the UK
had all ended policies that encouraged or tolerated labour migration from
Southern Europe and former colonies/the third world (Castles and Kosack 1973;
Hollifield 1992). Around the same time, even countries of permanent
settlement, such as Australia, found themselves cutting back on immigration, in
part due to rising unemployment.
•   From the 1970s, refugee-producing events in the South, and, after 1989, in the
Balkans escalated.
•   A global industry in the smuggling and, in some cases, trafficking of people has
enabled asylum seekers to evade immigration control measures imposed by
western nation-states.3
These developments have led to a sharp rise in asylum seekers since the 1980s. The
following table summarizes this movement.
Table 1
Asylum seekers in select Western countries, 1985-1998 (in thousands)*
Country 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria 6.7 8.7 11.4 15.8 21.9 22.8 27.3 16.2 4.7 5.1 5.9 7.0 6.7 13.8 20.1 18.3
Australia 6.1 7.2 5.1 7.6 9.8 9.3 8.2 9.5 13.1
Belgium 5.3 7.7 6.0 5.1 8.1 13.0 15.2 17.8 26.9 14.3 11.4 12.4 11.8 22.0 35.8 42.7
Canada 8.4 23.0 35.0 45.0 19.9 36.7 32.4 37.8 20.3 22.0 26.0 26.0 22.6 23.8 29.3 37.9
Denmark 8.7 9.3 2.8 4.7 4.6 5.3 4.6 13.9 14.4 6.7 5.1 5.9 5.1 5.7 7.0 12.2
Finland - - - - 0.2 2.5 2.1 3.6 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.4 3.1 3.2
France 25.8 23.4 24.8 31.6 60.0 56.0 46.5 28.9 27.6 26.0 20.2 17.2 21.0 22.4 31.0 38.6
Germany 73.9 99.7 57.4 103.1 121.0 193.0 256 438.2 322.6 127.2 127.9 116.4 151.7 98.6 95.1 78.8
Greece 1.4 4.3 6.3 9.3 6.5 4.1 2.7 2.0 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.6 4.4 3.0 1.5 3.0
Ireland - - - - - 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.2 3.9 4.6 7.7 10.1
Italy 5.4 6.5 11.0 1.3 2.2 4.7 31.7 2.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 0.6 1.9 11.1 33.4 15.6
Luxembourg - - - - - 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.7 2.9 0.6
Netherlands 5.7 5.9 13.5 7.5 14.0 21.2 21.6 20.3 35.4 52.5 29.3 22.9 34.4 45.2 39.3 44.0
Norway 0.9 2.7 8.6 6.6 4.4 4.0 4.6 5.2 12.9 3.4 1.5 1.8 2.3 8.4 10.2 10.1
Portugal 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.7 2.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
Spain 2.3 2.3 2.5 3.3 4.0 8.6 8.1 11.7 12.6 12.0 5.7 4.7 5.0 6.6 8.4 7.0
Sweden 14.5 14.6 18.1 19.6 32.0 29.0 27.3 84.0 37.6 18.6 9.0 5.8 9.7 12.8 11.2 16.3
Switzerland 9.7 8.6 10.9 16.7 24.4 36.0 41.6 18.0 24.7 16.1 17.0 18.0 24.0 41.3 46.0 17.6
UK 6.2 5.7 5.9 5.7 16.8 38.2 73.4 32.3 28.0 42.2 55.0 27.9 32.5 46.0 71.2 99.0
USA 150.1 207.5 209.6 216.2 155.3 75.7 52.1 46.0 59.3
Totals** - - - - 320.3 438.7 563.2 695.5 554.2 329.1 293.1 244.5 338.7 367.8 453.5 455.2
Notes: * Rounded figures; ** totals exclude Australia and USA.
Sources: Salt (1999); World Refugee Survey (1999); ECRE (1998); UNHCR (1995).
Governments viewed the increased numbers flowing from these developments as
undesirable for reasons bound up with domestic constitutions, legal jurisprudence and
social policy. Referring to Germany, but with implications for almost all OECD states,
Arthur Helton suggested that the ‘dirty little secret’ of asylum is that while many people
apply, few are granted refugee status (Helton 2002: 169). In Europe, only a fraction of
those arriving receive refugee status; in settler societies, only a minority. Whereas
Germany received 95,100 applications for asylum in 1999, only 10,940, or 8.6 per cent,
were recognized as refugees in that year; in France, the figures were 30,910
applications, 4,460 or a 14 per cent recognition rate; in the UK a total of 71,100
applicants for refugee status were received in 1999, with some 6,200 or 8.7 per cent
receiving refugee status. Even Canada, praised by UNHCR as an ‘exemplar’ in refugee
recognitions, has a recognition rate of less than 50 per cent, with 13,000 grants of
refugee status and 30,100 applications in 1999.1 In the US in the same year, the
recognition rate stood at 22 per cent.2
                                                
1 The figures are from UNHCR (2000: 321-4).
2 In most Western countries, the number actually given a right to stay is boosted significantly by grants
of humanitarian status.4
Another little secret is that while few are granted asylum status, fewer still leave. Yearly
removal rates hover at most in the 10-20 per cent range.3 The result is a gradually
expanding population of rejected asylum seekers remaining within Europe and North
America. In Germany alone, Interior Minister Otto Schilly told the then-British Home
Secretary Jack Straw, that there were some 400,000 rejected asylum seekers in 2000
that Germany cannot remove.4 A recent report by the greater London Authority
estimated that more than 75,000 people rejected for asylum or exceptional leave to
remain (a non-convention status) are residing illegally in London. The figure, moreover,
rises to 100,000 if dependents are included (Wintour 2001). Generalizations across
countries are difficult to make, but in the OECD somewhere between fifty and seventy
per cent of asylum seekers receive neither refugee nor a non-convention status but
nonetheless remain.
Removal rates are so low because of a series of moral, financial, legal and political
constraints.5 In the West, asylum seekers enter not any state, but a particular type of
state: a liberal democracy founded on a rights culture expressing itself in two ways.
First, the whole asylum system revolves around processing individual claims. Except in
‘fast-track’ cases, the process is time-consuming and expensive. Second, and closely
related, rights are linked with residence: the longer individuals spend on national
territory, the stronger the claim they can make against removal. The process is thus self-
reinforcing: the same rights culture that facilitates longer stays makes them the basis of
a legitimate claim to remain. Domestic constitutions and international treaties,
interpreted by national courts, sharply constrain the capacity to states to use return.
Within Europe, the process is compounded by social policy: national legislation and
judicial interpretation of it not only preventing the return of many rejected asylum
seekers but oblige states to provide housing, medical and subsistence-level welfare
support. In the UK alone, asylum seeker support in 2000 cost £835 million, or £34 per
UK household (BBC 2001). Once processing is added, the total bill is said to approach
£2 billion (The Guardian 2002).
The flip side of asylum seekers’ dependence on welfare is their non-participation in the
labour market. In many countries, including France and (since 1997) Germany,
legislation prohibits asylum seekers from seeking work. Yet, in countries like the UK
where work is allowed after six months, there is little evidence that asylum seekers
integrate into the legal market. They lack the professional accreditation, linguistic
ability or occupational skills (for instance, in high-tech industries) requisite to labour
market participation. In an era in which western nations used mass, low-skilled
immigration to fill positions within booming ‘old economy’ industries, an intermingling
of the asylum and immigration queues would have posed no difficulties. Today, these
jobs are either gone (the UK) or obtained only following highly competitive
apprenticeship programmes (Germany). That said, there is anecdotal evidence of
incorporation into the illegal labour market – as a visit to a London bar or a Berlin
construction site attests – but often under precarious conditions and substandard wages.6
                                                
3 At most because statistics on removal include in cases in addition to asylum seekers and because in
some countries, such as Germany, they include airport turnarounds.
4 Confidential source.
5 For a discussion of these, see Gibney and Hansen (2003).
6 On illegal migrants in Berlin’s construction industry, see Hadji-Ristic (n.d.).5
If there is a labour shortage at the low end of the occupational hierarchy, politicians,
especially in Northern Europe, are largely unwilling to admit it.
In short, the ending of primary immigration to Europe and the expansion of asylum
numbers, when interacting with constraints on removal and (European) social policy
commitments, have led asylum deep into political controversy. The symptoms are high
and in some cases spiralling costs, long delays for asylum seekers and growing public
opposition to asylum. As gaining access to national territory triggers the asylum process
and its attendant costs and obligations, policymakers have sought to erect barriers to this
access. The restrictionist policy framework is arguably most developed in Europe, but
Australia and the United States have at times been prepared to use the harshest
measures.
3 State responses
In response to the rising numbers and changed international and domestic contexts
outlined above, Western governments have introduced a range of policy measures to
prevent, deter, limit the stay of, and manage the settlement of asylum seekers and
refugees over the last 15 years. Though numerous and varied, the goals behind these
policies are more easily summarized: preventing asylum seekers from accessing state
territory; deterring potential asylum claims; limiting the amount of time asylum seekers
and refugees spend in the state; and, finally, imposing order on the inward movement of
refugees and, to a lesser extent, asylum seekers.
3.1 Measures to prevent access to state territory
Since the early 1990s, all Western states have embraced as a chief policy goal (arguably
the chief goal) the prevention of asylum seekers’ arrival at their frontiers or territory.
They have done so largely to avoid incurring responsibilities under the 1951 Refugee
Convention (and other domestic and international legal instruments), and by so doing to
escape the expenses of asylum processing and the possibility of political backlashes
caused by the arrival of large numbers of entrants.
Beginning in the early 1980s a number of traditional immigration policy measures,
notably visas and carrier sanctions, were either re-tooled or initiated to prevent the
arrival of asylum seekers. Notwithstanding talk of wanting simply to prevent the
movement of economic migrants, all Western countries now use visa regimes, more or
less explicitly, to prevent the movement of people from refugee source countries (such
as Iraq and Afghanistan) to their territory. There are, to be sure, variations across states.
Australia, for example, requires visas for all foreign nationals wishing to enter its
territory; whereas Canada, the US and EU members states require visas only for the
nationals of countries deemed to produce large numbers of asylum seekers or over-
stayers (for example, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda). Member countries of the EU have,
under the Schengen agreement, harmonized visa requirements, resulting in a situation
where the citizens of some 120 countries now require visas to enter EU states. While
visa regimes have purposes other than stopping asylum flows, the linkage with asylum
was evidenced in the imposition of visa requirements for Sri Lankans by the British
government in 1986; for Algerians by the French in the same year; and, more recently,6
for Hungarians by the Canadian government in 2001. In almost all cases, asylum
seekers wishing to travel to the West have to apply for visas; in almost all cases western
states deny visas to those believed to be seeking asylum.
Carrier sanctions, the levelling of fines on sea, air and land carriers that bring foreign
nationals (for example, asylum seekers) without proper documentation or visas to state
territory, are now a part of the immigration control armoury of almost all states.
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and the US all
use such sanctions, though the penalties they impose vary between approximately
Euro  100 for each individual brought to state territory (in the case of Italy) to a
maximum fee of Euro 10,000 (for complicit carriers in Germany, 1997 figures). In July
2002, the French presidency of the EU proposed a directive harmonizing carrier
sanctions (NoborderZone 2002).
Pre-inspection regimes in foreign countries to prevent unwanted arrivals are another,
more innovative, example of migration policy by ‘remote control’.7 By the end of the
1990s, the UK, Canada, the US, Sweden and France had employed an advance guard of
immigration staff, commonly referred to as airport liaison officers, in select foreign
airports to detect potential illegal entrants. Australia, the Netherlands and Norway, on
the other hand, have sent immigration officials abroad to train airline staff at foreign
airports to recognize fraudulent or incomplete documentation. The United States goes
one step further, posting its immigration gates abroad; travellers from Dublin, Montreal
and Toronto pass through immigration control and enter the United States while
physically still in Ireland or Canada.8 The primary goal of visa regimes, carrier
sanctions, and pre-inspection is to prevent the arrival of unwanted and illegal entrants.
While pre-inspection regimes extend migration boundaries, some states have also
contracted their boundaries to evade asylum claims. Switzerland, France, German and
Spain have all declared parts of their airports international zones. Such zones are
established to function as areas in which officials are not obliged to provide asylum
seekers or foreign individuals with some or all of the protections available to those
officially on state territory (for example, the right to legal representation, or access to a
review process) in order to enable speedy removal from the country. In a similar vein,
the US has used Guantanamo Bay for the processing of Haitian and Cuban asylum
claims in order to obviate the need to grant them the constitutional protections held by
foreigners on US sovereign territory.9 Arguably the most radical development along
these lines was the Australian government’s redefinition of the status of its island
territories for immigration purposes. A 2001 law ‘excised’ Christmas Island, Ashmore
Reef, the Cocos Island, and other territories from its migration zone, so that the landing
of asylum seekers on these territories did not engage most of the country’s protection
                                                
7 We borrow this term from Aristide Zolberg.
8 US officials, it is important to note, have sometimes tended to justify the use of pre-inspection as a
way of easing the movement of people from favoured countries (for example, Ireland and Canada)
rather than as a way of boosting control per se.
9 In 1994, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that these aliens ‘had no legal rights under
the domestic law of the US or under international law’ because such rights were available only to
persons on US territory. The court found that Guantanamo Bay, while under US ‘jurisdiction and
control’, was not US sovereign territory. See Jones (1995).7
obligations. While Australia’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention still
applied, the more extensive protections and entitlements associated with the country’s
domestic asylum laws, including the right to seek review of negative decisions, were no
longer available to individuals on these territories (USCR 2002a).
Finally, states have resorted to interdiction to prevent asylum seekers from accessing
national territory. While all interdiction aims to prevent asylum seekers from reaching
the territory (or waters) of the repelling country, the implications for asylum seekers
differ between cases. In some cases, asylum seekers are indiscriminately turned back to
the country from which they departed; in others, some attempt is made to separate out
refugees through a preliminary screening procedure, thus reducing the chances of
refoulement. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, US policy towards Haitian boat
people moved back and forth between these two responses (Perusse 1995). In other
cases still, interdicted asylum seekers are taken to an off-shore territory or to a safe third
country with or without the intention of resettlement in the interdicting country if
determined to be refugees. Australia used the latter response during the Tampa incident
of 2001. The island nation of Nauru was enlisted to host asylum seekers while their
eligibility for refugee status was assessed (Perusse 1995).
All interdiction increases the risk of refoulement; indeed, it arguably violates any
reasonable interpretation of the principle.10 Nonetheless, interdiction appears to be
becoming more acceptable. In a scene worthy of Jean Raspail’s Camp of Saints, the UK,
faced with rising numbers of asylum seekers in 2001, announced that it was considering
deploying naval carriers in the Mediterranean to prevent illegal migrants from arriving
in Europe (Milne 2002). The announcement had, to be sure, the flavour of a publicity
stunt for the consumption of the highly restrictionist British electorate. But the
government’s willingness even to float the idea illustrates how the bounds of acceptable
discourse and practice has been shifting.
3.2 Measures to deter arrivals
While preventative measures directly impede the entry of asylum seekers, deterrent
measures operate more indirectly. They attempt to discourage asylum seekers from
seeking asylum in a particular state by making the costs of entry so high (or the benefits
so low) that arrival is not attempted. While analytically distinguishable, there is an
obvious overlap in practice between preventative and deterrent measures because many
policies that prevent entry also deter others from arriving (for example, interdiction
policies increase the chance of being refused entry in a particular country and thus can
act to dissuade people from seeking asylum there). The deterrent policies commonly
used by states have focussed on reducing the privileges and entitlements available to
asylum seekers claiming asylum.
                                                
10 The US Supreme Court has demurred, however. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council (1994) it ruled six
to one in 1994 that interdicting Haitian boats before they reached US territorial waters and returning
the occupants to Haiti, without assessment of their asylum claim, was not a violation of domestic US
or international law.8
These policies have recently included:
•   Limitations on employment. In order to discourage economic migrants entering
via the asylum route, most Western countries restrict the right of asylum seekers
to gain paid employment while their claims are processed. In France, the US
and Germany (since May 1997), asylum seekers may not work at anytime
during processing. In the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium, there is a delay of
12 weeks, six months and during initial processing, respectively. In Austria,
they may work only in auxiliary services directly related to their
accommodation (for example, cleaning). Canada is one of the few exceptions to
this rule: an asylum claimant is eligible for a nine-month work authorization
after a medical examination.
•   Limitations on welfare. At the same time as limiting work, governments have
also restricted access to state funds, ostensibly to reduce the pull factor of
welfare payments. Asylum seekers are typically offered welfare either at a
reduced level relative to permanent residents, or under more stringent
conditions (for example, USA, France, Australia, Italy, Spain); or are, pocket
money aside, eligible only to receive in-kind benefits rather than cash payments
(UK, Germany). The UK has also tried to deny welfare to individuals who do
not apply for asylum immediately after arrival. In the US, asylum seekers are
expected to rely on family and charity.
•   Detention and restrictions on residency. While newly arrived asylum seekers
(like immigrants) typically desire to congregate in cities close to previous
waves of their co-nationals and to immigrant services, recent government
policies have attempted to restrict where asylum seekers reside. Asylum seekers
in EU states are usually required to live in special accommodation centres often
outside major cities.11 To prevent asylum seekers from residing in London, UK
officials have made housing and welfare benefits dependent upon applicants
moving to other areas of the country, including the North. As well as
supposedly deterring economic migrants, restrictions on where asylum seekers
live are seen as making it easier for officials to keep track of applicants and
more difficult for individuals to disappear into the community. In Australia, the
US and Canada asylum seekers not in detention are more likely to have access
to traditional forms of public housing and thus to greater choice in their place of
residence.
All of the restrictions on work, welfare and accommodation outlined above have
rationales other than deterrence. Geographical dispersal policies, for example, may
spread the social cost of housing new arrivals between different communities or
provinces; this is the basic practice in Germany. But over the last decade deterring new
asylum claims has increasingly come to be part of the public rationale for such
restrictions. This is particularly apparent in the case of another key public policy,
arguably the severest: detention.
                                                
11 The UK is one country where this has traditionally not been true. However, plans outlined in the
governments most recent white paper on asylum and immigration (Home Office 2002), and included
in recent legislation, foreshadow a move to establish new accommodation centers to house asylum
seekers.9
While all of Western states detain asylum seekers for at least some reasons, the extent
and length of detention varies widely. Detention is resorted to least in continental
European countries, notably France, Sweden, Germany, and in Canada, where
constitutional law typically limits detention to individuals who are deemed likely to
abscond or whose identity has not yet been ascertained.12 The UK government, by
contrast, faces relatively few domestic legal constraints on its use of detention (an
important recent House of Lords’ judicial ruling decision overturned a lower court
decision that detention for the sake of administrative convenience was unlawful) (Travis
2002). Yet, as discussed above, practical and moral considerations, compounded by a
lack of available detention places, mean that only a relatively small percentage of all
asylum seekers is detained. Detention is used mostly freely in Australia and the US. In
the US, under 1996 legislation, all asylum applicants without a right to remain on a
valid visa are at a minimum detained until they can establish that they have a ‘credible
fear of persecution’. In Australia, all asylum seekers arriving in the country without a
valid visa or other documentation are subjected to mandatory detention for the period
during which their claims are processed (in some cases over a year). The location of
detention centres far from the major cities in isolated, outback areas of the country
merely increases the deterrent effect of the government’s policy.
3.3 Measures to limit stay
Through preventative and deterrent measures governments have been able to avoid
some of the social, economic and political costs of asylum. However, in spite of these
measures, historically large numbers of asylum seekers continue to arrive in Western
states claiming protection. The key policy issue involved with these arrivals over the
last decade has been how to limit the period of time they spend in the state. In
particular, governments have grappled with the question of how to ensure that
individuals with failed asylum claims and refugees no longer in need of protection are
removed. This policy priority grows out of the recognition that the removal of unwanted
foreigners becomes more difficult – legally, politically and morally – the longer that
they have been resident. Moreover, the failure to remove rejected asylum applicants is
widely believed not only to bring the integrity of asylum determination systems into
question, but to encourage abuse of asylum systems by economic migrants (Van Kessel
2001).
As we shall now show, policies aimed at limiting residence and hastening departures
have been introduced in all aspects of the asylum process in recent years. They now run
the gamut from initial admission to final removal.
•   Exclusion from the asylum process. Western states have used a range of policy
measures to exclude asylum seekers from determination procedures making
them eligible for return. Most significantly, countries have invoked, with
limited success, safe third country (STC) measures. The safe third country
principle links asylum applications with first destination; asylum seekers are
                                                
12 In Sweden, for example, ‘illegal migrants’, applying for asylum, may be held in detention only until
their identity has been established. This process takes around two weeks to two months (Migration
News 2001).10
expected to apply in the first safe country they reach.13 It has reached its most
developed form in the Dublin Convention, signed by EU states, which came
into force in 1997. Despite difficulties in facilitating return amongst Dublin
signatory states, countries outside Europe have shown increasing interest in
STC agreements. Since 1995, Australia has treated China as a STC for Sino-
Vietnamese asylum applicants,14 and Canada and the US have recently
negotiated such an agreement (USCR 2002b). In addition to STC agreements,
states, such as the US, have limited access to asylum systems by introducing
penalties on the future re-entry for asylum seekers who are found not to have a
valid claim for asylum.15 Many states, including the US and the UK, have also
legislated in recent years to exclude individuals from asylum systems on the
grounds of ‘non-compliance’, that is, failing to submit application forms on
time or attend required hearings. This is not a minor development. In the UK in
2000, a full 27 per cent of all asylum applications were refused on the grounds
of this category of technicality alone (Scottish Refugee Council).
•   Speeding the process of determination. In addition to reducing the number of
asylum claims, Western states have also attempted to boost the judicial and
administrative efficiency of asylum processing. Many asylum systems
(Germany, the UK, Canada, the US) faced large backlogs in asylum
applications in the 1990s due to a combination of rising numbers of applicants
and inadequate funding (see Table 1). These backlogs encouraged the creation
of fast track procedures. In Canada such procedures enable individuals from
well-known countries of persecution to be quickly admitted to Refugee
Convention or humanitarian status. In the US, the post 1996 system of
expedited removals ensured the immediate departure of individuals entering
without proper documentation not deemed to have a ‘credible fear’. In the UK
and most other European countries those deemed to be from a safe country of
origin have their claims determined through a pared down asylum process. The
increasing judicialization of refugee decision-making has posed another
challenge for officials as appeals to the law courts invariably slow down
decision-making. In response, governments in Australia, the US and the UK
have engaged (with mixed results) in legislative attempts to cut off avenues for
legal appeals of asylum decisions.16
                                                
13 In addition, the Dublin Convention adds further criteria: family members and past receipt of a visa.
14 http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/74unauthorised.htm.
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ineligible for any immigration benefits.
16 US legislation in 1996 limited judicial review on a range of decisions by the Attorney General to lift
bans on an individual’s ability to apply for asylum (for example, for reasons of changed circumstances
in an asylum seeker’s country of origin). Successive Australian governments have legislated to limit
the powers of the judiciary in asylum matters. 1992 legislation, for example, said that the courts were
not to release asylum seekers detained for arriving without valid visas. See, USCR (2002c). The
hostility of the current Howard government is, if anything, stronger, see the Sydney Morning Herald
(2002). The British Home Secretary, David Blunkett, has also been publicly critical of judicial
decisions that threaten the government’s liberty to make policy in the area of asylum. See, The
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•   Restricting grants of permanent residence. Traditionally, Convention refugee
status has been a ticket to long-term residence or even citizenship in Western
states. Since the mid 1990s, however, the connection between refugee status
and permanent residence has become looser. States have increasingly linked the
admittance of refugees for resettlement with a requirement of return when
conditions in the country of origin improve. EU member states (including
Austria, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands) have used various forms of
temporary protection during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and/or
Kosovo. Outside Europe, Canada and the US were more reluctant to use the
status, though Australia took Kosovan refugees on a temporary basis. Refugees
admitted under temporary schemes have usually received new and often ad hoc
forms of status rather than Geneva Convention protection. The end of
temporary protection regimes has proven a controversial business, especially
when refugees have been reluctant to return. In response, states have devised a
number of supplementary policy measures: ‘look and see’ visits (UK, Germany,
Nordic states), start up payments upon return (UK, Germany, Nordic countries),
and, more punitively, the withdrawal of welfare assistance (Germany) and the
threat of removal to new locations (Australia) have all been used to boost the
likelihood of departure.17 Temporary protection is not new (the US employed
temporary schemes for Central American refugees in the 1980s and 1990s).18
However, the spread of such schemes during the 1990s and the (albeit gradual)
emergence of an EU legal infrastructure for temporary protection are novel.
Moreover, the uses of temporary protection appear to be changing. The
Australian government has recently used it in a punitive fashion to discourage
asylum seekers. According to 1999 legislation, ‘unauthorized’ arrivals later
determined to be refugees may not be granted permanent residence visas. They
are eligible only for temporary protection visas, a status that denies them family
reunion rights and the ability freely to travel overseas, as well as security of
status.19
•   Removals and deportations. Despite the moral, practical and financial
constraints on deportation, states have adopted a range of measures designed to
encourage departure. The US, for example, expanded use of detention in 1996
Act, thus expediting the process of return for failed applicants; Canada has
recently increased its technological resources for tracking the status of asylum
seekers to coordinate swift return after unsuccessful asylum decisions; 2003
legislation in Britain aims to create a more ‘holistic’ asylum process that will
ensure that asylum seekers are kept under the eye of the state from initial entry
to final departure; finally, Germany, along with many other countries, has, since
the early 1990s, entered into a range of aid, trade and immigration bargaining
with asylum source countries to ensure the readmission of rejected asylum
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(2000).
18 Although the concept is understood differently in the US: it is granted only to individuals already in
the US when home circumstances change.
19 The scope of those to whom these restrictions applied was increased further and made more punitive
by legislation in 2001. For more details, see USCR (2000).12
applicants and undocumented migrants.20 Notwithstanding these initiatives,
human rights and practical constraints seem likely to ensure that the gap
between those eligible for deportation and those actually removed remains a
feature of Western asylum systems for some time to come.
3.4 Measures to manage arrival
Beyond prevention and deterrence, Western states have engaged in a range of somewhat
more positive ways to make the arrival of asylum seekers more orderly and equitable.
Reform of refugee decision-making and the use of resettlement programmes have been
two such areas.
Refugee decision-making. In the midst of constructing measures to limit asylum seeker
numbers during the 1980s and 1990s, many states put more thought, energy and
resources into refugee determination procedures, resulting in general to improvements
in the quality and professionalism with which asylum decisions are made. This has been
clear, for example, in Canada, where a highly regarded body, independent of the
immigration department, the Immigration and Refugee Board, has been established to
make decisions on refugee status. In the US, a professional corps of asylum decision
makers was created at the beginning of the 1990s, thus enabling the disentanglement of
determination decisions from foreign policy and immigration enforcement pressures
(Joppke 1999: 119; Martin and Schoenholtz 2000). It is perhaps no coincidence that
both the US and Canada have some of the highest rates of grants of refugee status of
any Western countries. Over the last decade, a range of countries, including Canada,
Australia and the US have also radically improved the quality of country of origin
information used in making asylum decisions, enabling greater accuracy in the
assessment of claims (Martin and Schoenholtz 2000).
Resettlement programmes. During the period of rising asylum numbers in the 1990s,
traditional immigration countries, such as Australia, the US and Canada, operated
annual resettlement programmes for refugees. These programmes, which have served as
a kind of adjunct to skilled migration schemes, have allowed pre-screened refugees
from first countries of asylum to enter for resettlement. Well over one million refugees
(and people in humanitarian need) entered under these schemes during the 1990s.
By contrast, EU states, such as Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, have
traditionally provided (both permanent and temporary) resettlement places on an ad hoc
basis in response to specific refugee crises. Nonetheless, in 2002 the UK government
announced its intention to follow the lead of countries like Australia and the US and
implement an annual resettlement scheme (beginning with a modest annual intake of
500) ostensibly in order to allow legitimate refugees a legal way of reaching Britain;
other Northern European countries are already operating similar schemes. While these
schemes may represent a positive development, a range of concerns remain. Some
worry that resettlement will be offered as an alternative to protection for asylum
seekers; that governments will choose for entry only refugees with desired labour
market or language skills; and that the provision of new places for pre-screened
refugees will legitimate even harsher preventative practices towards claimants at the
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frontiers. Linkages of this sort are hardly beyond the realms of possibility. The recent
practice of the Australian government has been to reduce the number of refugees it
settles annually by the number of on shore asylum applicants the country receives in
order to balance its overall refugee intake.21
While new unilateral measures in the area of resettlement are beginning to emerge,
burden (or responsibility) sharing remains, despite many EU-level proposals, relatively
undeveloped. In the 1990s, Germany was a strong supporter of responsibility sharing,
while France and especially the United Kingdom were generally hostile (Thielemann
2002). Unsurprisingly, when asylum applications to the UK trebled in the late 1990s, its
policymakers began to see the benefits of cooperating with other EU countries. The
various proposals for burden sharing slot into one of two broad schemes: financially
compensating member states receiving disproportionate numbers or devising formulas
for fairly distributing refugees between states in situation of mass influx, like Kosovo.
The most promising is clearly a system of financial recompense. Indeed in the late
1990s, the EU established the European Refugee Fund to create a financial pool (so far
a fairly paltry one) to ‘create an equitable mechanism for sharing financial responsibility
for supporting refugees between Member states’ (ECRE 2001: 12). Agreeing to share
actual refugees between states has proven more difficult. The kind of solidarity amongst
member states that would enable them to transcend a cost-benefit analysis of their
interest in specific refugee situations has thus far been lacking.22
In summary, the responses put in place by states are remarkable both for the vast array
of different policy measures involved and for the speed of their development. Policy
measures that touch upon all aspects of the asylum seeking (and migration) processes
have been assembled by states in little over a decade. The story is one of learning and
convergence: while there is no doubt that some states operate stricter measures than
others, the main elements of state policies (visa regimes, carrier sanctions, safe third
country agreements, fast tracking schemes, readmission arrangements, etc.) are
essentially very similar. It is also one in which the harshest policy developments
towards asylum seekers – those that come closest to violating the 1951 Convention or
international human rights obligations – have been pioneered by traditional immigration
countries, notably the US and Australia.23 A history of receptiveness and experience
with economic migration in no way guarantees that a welcome will be extended to
asylum seekers. Finally, while the bulk of restrictive policy measures developed have
been legitimated publicly by the desire to disentangle mixed flows (by the aim to
preserve asylum for ‘real’ refugees), most policy measures are completely
indiscriminate in their effects. They are, that is, as likely to prevent, deter or punish the
entry of legitimate refugees as economic migrants. Equally however, such measuresare
likely to remain, and in the next section we offer an evaluation of their effects.
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4 Effects
To what extent has the raft to policy measures implemented to deal with rising numbers
of asylum seekers been effective? The question of whether particular policies are
effective cannot be disentangled from the question of whom they are effective for. There
are at least three different perspectives: those of Western governments, those of people
in need of protection, and those of the international community. Each reflects a different
interest in relation to asylum and, consequently, generates a different standard for
evaluating current practices. In what follows, we will briefly outline these different
perspectives and consider, in broad terms, the extent to which the current amalgam of
policies can be considered effective.
The Western government perspective. What have governments been trying to achieve
through the array of public policy measures they have implemented over the last two
decades? While there are difficulties in generalizing across states and in seeking too
much coherence in their purposes, Western governments appear to have been struggling
to put in place systems that achieve the following goal: the delivery to their borders of a
manageable flow of asylum seekers and refugees that is stable in that it does not
fluctuate dramatically upwards over time.
Two points are worth clarifying. First, the requirement of a manageable flow assumes
that states do have reasons for accepting refugees and asylum seekers. These reasons
emerge from the desire of states to be seen domestically and internationally as
respectful of humanitarian goals, from the requirements of inherited legal commitments
(notably, the 1951 Refugee Convention) and, in some cases, from pressure by internal
interest groups, both economic and ethnic, and external actors, such as other states.
What is interpreted as a manageable flow will vary, in numerical terms, between states
depending on their size, migration history, integrative capability, etc. A manageable
flow for Ireland is going to be different than one for the US. Second, the requirement of
stability (that is, that entrants not rise dramatically over time) stems from the desire by
governments to be seen as in control of the inward movement of foreigners. Large short
or long term rises in asylum seeker arrivals are viewed as politically intolerable.24 In
sum, Western states have attempted to purge asylum seeker movements of their unruly
and unpredictable characteristics. The aim of policy making has generally been to
impose on asylum movements the kind of predictability and manageability associated
with quota-based refugee resettlement schemes.
If the combination of manageability and stability is an accurate way of describing
government aspirations, then very few Western states could, by 2001, be said to be
operating effective asylum policies. Taking the criterion of stability, only in seven out
of 21 countries was the difference between the highest annual intake of asylum seekers
and the lowest annual intake between 1995 and 2000 less than 100 per cent: Australia,
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. Indeed, in 11 countries it was greater
than 200 per cent. In terms of overall trends, only three Western states received fewer
asylum applications in the three years between 1998 and 2000 than in the years between
1995 and 1997: Germany, Portugal and the US. Two other countries experienced only a
small increase: Australia and Spain. In the rest, the volume of asylum seekers rose
substantially and often dramatically. While Portugal and Spain have never experienced
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substantial asylum flows, all the other states with falling (or fairly stagnant) numbers
have been at the forefront of restrictive measures over the last decade. Germany
pioneered ‘safe third country procedures’ and readmission agreements in an attempt to
insulate itself from asylum claims; Australia and the US have both used interdiction and
operate the toughest detention policies.25
According to these criteria, we have a complicated story: only a small number of states
appear to have asylum application volumes that have not fluctuated dramatically in
recent years; fewer still appear to have applications on a downward trend.26 The
ineffectiveness of the policy responses of most states is reflected in widespread public
dissatisfaction. The success of the far-right in elections in Austria, Denmark and the
Netherlands (joining the governing coalition in all three), and the success of Jean Marie
Le Pen (which was stunning from a political point of view, less so from a psephological
one) all came on the back of anti-immigrant sentiment. The Howard government in
Australia snatched electoral victory from the jaws of defeat by playing up public
concerns over boat people claiming asylum. Finally, much is beyond the control of
national policy. The US and Germany, the UK and most other Western states have
substantial levels of illegal migration that do not enter into asylum statistics. It is
possible that tough asylum policies have deflected potential asylum seekers into a life
underground. It is also impossible to know whether low asylum applications in a
country reflect the success of its policy or its relative unattractiveness to other asylum
seekers vis à vis other destinations. The case of the UK, which five years ago could
have been described as operating successful policies, suggests that harsh policy
measures only deter while other countries operate more inclusive measures (Hansen
2002). If all states scramble to implement tough policies, any relative advantage in
avoiding asylum seekers accruing to restrictive states is lost.
The perspective of those seeking protection. How might those in need of protection
judge the effectiveness of recent asylum policies? It seems reasonable to assume that
refugees would do so on the basis of whether the policies respected the basic human
rights of asylum seekers and increased the likelihood that those in need of protection
would receive it.
The interests of those in need of protection yield straightforward standards for assessing
recent policy developments. First, do they make it easier or harder for refugees to gain
the protection of asylum? Over a five year period, the number of refugees (as
determined by the UNHCR) has fallen, as has the number of asylum applications across
Western states. Importantly, however, the fall in the proportion gaining access to
Western asylum systems has outstripped the decrease in the volume of the world’s
refugees. In 1995, there were 14.5 million refugees, and 695,500 asylum applications in
Europe; in 2000, the figures were 12 million (a 17 per cent drop) and 455,000 (a 25 per
cent drop).27 While this does not prove that asylum is becoming more difficult for
refugees to access, it makes such a claim highly plausible, particularly given that anti-
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asylum measures have fallen indiscriminately on genuine refugees as well as economic
migrants.
Second, do recent policy measures respect the human rights of asylum seekers? The
position of asylum seekers has unquestionably deteriorated as a result of recent policies.
First, the proliferation of preventative measures has driven asylum seekers into taking
greater and greater risks (being sealed in lorries, jumping moving trains, etc.) to enter
Western states. The increasing sophistication of barriers to entry has also meant that
many asylum seekers must rely on traffickers to enter, a reliance that can lead to
enslavement in an immigration underworld (Gibney 2000b). Second, deterrence
measures used by states increasingly deprecate the rights of asylum seekers (to work, to
live where they choose, to welfare, to freedom, etc.) in order to deter the arrival of
others. Not only are these deprivations ethically dubious in themselves, but by reducing
the gap between the rights the state offers and the relative freedom of living outside the
law as an illegal, they may, as we have noted, encourage legitimate refugees to abandon
the asylum system altogether (Morrison and Crosland 2001; Gibney 2000b). In sum,
there is a strong, if not overwhelming, case that policy changes in the west have harmed
the interests of refugees; for scholars working in the area, this conclusion will come as
no surprise.
The perspective of international society. The perspective of international society refers
to something more nebulous than the other perspectives we have discussed. Here we
mean to denote a long-term or enlightened interest that all states (Western and non-
Western) have in ensuring the survival of the institution of asylum. Asylum is both
valuable in itself and linked to other common interests, such as humane governance,
solidarity between states, and international stability. While it may be in the short-term
interests of Western governments to reduce the number of asylum seekers they receive,
their actions can have hidden costs both for other actors and, in the long term, for
themselves. For example, policies that deflect or contain refugees can generate regional
instability or corrode international norms on refugee protection by creating great
inequalities in the burdens between states.
Considered from this perspective, recent policies enacted by Western governments
certainly fall short of being effective. Given that such policies are not aimed at
maximizing protection, this conclusion is unremarkable. The bulk of energy has gone
into implementing practices that deter and prevent movement with little regard for the
stability of the states or regions that asylum seekers attempt to move from. A number of
observers have pointed out that Western policies effectively contain refugees in the
South, and to the poorest countries therein; see, for example, Chimni (1998) and Helton
(2002). Furthermore, many recent Western practices come close to corroding
fundamental refugee norms, notably the principle of non-refoulement. The practice of
interdiction is the clearest example, but the general movement to shift border control
measures outwards is, at its worse, an attempt by Western states to escape 1951
Convention responsibilities at the expense of other states.28 Even when their actions do
not undermine the non-refoulement norm directly, the employment of non-arrival
measures by Western states has served to underwrite the increasing reluctance of
countries in the South to take in or to continue to host refugees (Loescher 1993).
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Finally, when they are successful, current policies aimed at deterrence and prevention
discourage cooperation by states to deal with the long term economic and political
causes of refugee and asylum seeker movements. For those states that manage to escape
large refugee flows are sapped of any motivation to ameliorate the factors that give rise
to refugees.
These deterrent and preventative policies do not, however, simply find their motivation
in state malice and ill will. Publics, particularly in Europe but also in Canada and
Australia, are suspicious of current levels of asylum seekers. That suspicion turns to
hostility when numbers suddenly increase or arrivals generate media attention, as they
did in Germany in 1992, the UK in 2000 and Australia in 2001. In all cases, the
convergence of a series of factors places liberal democratic governments in an acute
dilemma. Long first-determination processing times (ranging from several months to
several years) and appeal rights mean that even ‘illegitimate’ asylum seekers may
remain for several years once they have reached national territory. Costs associated with
asylum seekers – for housing, medical care, subsistence and legal costs – are high, and
are compounded by asylum seekers exclusion from the labour market and/or their poor
performance within it. Finally, limits on deportation mean that, despite low recognition
rates, the entry of asylum seekers correlates highly with the likelihood of their stay. In
short, governments have turned to exclusionary measures in part because of the liberal
and inclusionary nature of the liberal democratic polity itself. The relative liberality
with which asylum seekers are treated once they reach the soil of Western states is
closely related to the complex of exclusions designed by states to keep them from doing
so.29 With this basic dilemma in mind, we turn in the next section to possible future
directions for asylum policy in the West. Of the four proposals, the first is most
consistent with the current asylum regime; the last three would involve departures,
possibly substantial ones, from it.30 Space limitations present a full treatment of this




One possible way of relieving pressure on asylum systems, often proposed by activists
and scholars, is expanding possibilities for legal immigration. Doing so would seem to
have the great advantage of calling states’ bluff. The claim that large numbers of asylum
seekers are ‘bogus’ economic migrants is made frequently; if there were any truth in the
claim, expanding economic migration would take pressure off asylum queues. If there
were little in the claim, then allowing new forms of legal migration would have no
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effect on asylum applications, exposing states’ arguments as untenable. In practice, the
matter is unlikely to be that simple. Western states face two sorts of labour shortages: an
avowed high-skilled shortage, particularly in high-tech industries, and a concealed, low-
skilled shortage for precarious, badly paid and unappealing jobs. An expansion of high
skilled migration is occurring in Europe: in the last decade, Germany and the United
Kingdom have expanded opportunities for high skilled immigration, and there is
pressure for France to follow suit. In these countries, illegal migrants, some of whom
are undoubtedly asylum seekers, now fill low-skill shortages. In Southern Europe, Spain
and Italy have gone a step further, regularizing in 1993 and 1998 low-skilled migrant
labour.31 As yet, these changes have had little impact on movements of asylum seekers.
In Northern Europe, those gaining access to the high skilled labour market are highly
educated individuals in either professional employment or education in their countries
of origin; they are often selected directly by the companies themselves. In Southern
Europe, the numbers accepted – some 30,000 in Spain – are too low to have any broader
impact on asylum flows to Europe. It is true that applications to Spain and Italy are
modest, possibly suggesting some local effect. Yet, it might also be the case that asylum
seekers and traffickers view these countries as transit countries on the way to Northern
Europe.
In short, expanding immigration categories might have some influence on asylum
applications, but it is by no means certain and would require an ambitious programme
for accepting large numbers of low-skilled migrants. There is little evidence to suggest
that European publics would support such a move, and, even if an enlightened elite led
them, trade unions would offer stiff resistance to low pay and poor working conditions.
What’s more, such a programme might also have to be linked with limitations on access
to welfare if such benefits were greater than the market wage (see below).
5.2 Expanded resettlement
A second way of ensuring a future for asylum in the West would be through a greater
focus by these countries on the resettlement of refugees. Resettlement, once a major tool
of asylum policy in the West, has declined in a more or less direct relationship with
increases in asylum applications over the 1990s. In 2001, only five EU countries
(Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Denmark and The Netherlands) took part in the UNHCR
refugee resettlement programme with a miserly quota of 2,652 refugees between them.
Canada alone accepted three times as many – 7,500 in 2000, and the US set a 2001
quota for the resettlement of 80,000 refugees.32 The UK, in an effort to compensate for
its restrictive attitude to refugees over the last decade, has offered to resettle a risible
500.
The current unpopularity of resettlement belies the fact that it could be a useful tool for
managing asylum pressures. Resettlement programmes enable states to admit refugees
in a way likely to minimize political controversy. By enabling the number of refugees
arriving in any particular year to be publicly determined and announced in advance,
present public concerns that the arrival of asylum seekers reflects policy failure on the
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part of governments could be defused. The benefits for advancing refugee protection are
obvious. By opening up new avenues for asylum in Western states, resettlement
programmes could be used to discourage refugees from using irregular (and often
expensive and highly dangerous) routes to gain the protection they need. The effects on
asylum pressures would, moreover, grow in proportion to the number of states that
agreed to operate such programmes or to increases in the number of people coming
under current ones. A new and concerted commitment to resettlement might also
strengthen the institution of asylum internationally. While the deterrent and preventative
practices of Western countries are currently eroding the traditional willingness of
Southern countries to accept refugees, greater use of resettlement in the West might well
encourage a renewed faith in the institution of asylum and a greater willingness to host
refugees.
Important challenges would of course still remain. A greater number of refugees
accepted through resettlement schemes might reduce flows of refugees arriving
‘spontaneously’ in Western states, but it would not reduce such arrivals entirely, nor
affect the volume of economic migrants. Moreover, for resettlement to have any real
affect on asylum pressures, it would need to be embraced by a substantial number of
states. Yet states have proven themselves notoriously reluctant to embark upon
cooperative schemes in the refugee realm when the possibilities of ‘free riding’ (opting
out of providing asylum in the knowledge that other countries would continue to take
their fair share of refugees) would be high. Some kind of international legal agreement,
such as an additional protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, that could enshrine the
resettlement obligation of states in law might be necessary in order to encourage
compliance.
5.3 Asylum without welfare: a market based approach
Another way in which asylum might be reformed would involve leaving the processing
machinery untouched and instead reforming the social policies accompanying it. This
would involve the radical step of ending the incorporation of asylum seekers into the
welfare state; such a reform would have its greatest application in Europe. Asylum
seekers would be processed as they currently are, but they would not be entitled to
income support and housing benefits (they would retain access to health care and
education). If granted refugee status, the right to such support would then follow. While
their claims were being processed, asylum seekers would be entitled to work. It would
be delusional to claim that such a radical step would not lead to considerable misery for
asylum seekers, and perhaps discomfort in the form of crime and street violence for
Europeans. But it would have the great advantage of undercutting one far-right
argument against asylum seekers, and it would definitively resolve the debate about
whether asylum seekers are fleeing violence or simply seeking social support. It would
in effect involve accepting that asylum and migration are not distinct movements, and
allowing the market to determine asylum movements.
Such a step is emphatically not a turn to open borders. Western states would continue to
control their borders and, at least in the short term, to maintain the panoply of restrictive
measures currently in place. If asylum seekers were able to integrate into labour markets
with relative ease and/or if numbers of asylum seekers fell to a more manageable rate,
states could then look to dismantling – with relative security from populist backlash –
these measures. The asylum procedure system itself would be maintained, but efforts20
should be concentrated on speeding application decisions, as it would generally be
accepted that the difference between recognition and rejection is one between residence
with or without social rights, and not between residence and return. After a determined
period of time, asylum seekers who remained in the western states could be granted full
social entitlements. Welfare incorporation would follow labour market incorporation
rather than preceding it.
5.4 Expanded possibilities for return
A fourth possibility faces serious political constraints and is morally dubious, but it
deserves mention if only for analytical purposes. If nation-states’ desire to restrict
access flows from limits on removal, it follows that policymakers and the public might
be more willing to tolerate large numbers of asylum seekers if they could be confident
that there would be a clearer relationship between rejection and return. Even if
expanded return were morally acceptable, it would be difficult to implement in practice,
as it would require much shorter processing times, further limits on rights to appeal and
resort to mass deportations, likely with military carriers. It is hard to imagine such a
regime being consistent with either national jurisprudence or liberal democratic norms.
It would require moving the entire asylum system away from its individualist and
legalist foundation to a much more utilitarian one. There would be many more false
negatives (that is, genuine refugees would be denied protection) that would have to be
set against greater ease of access to national territories for the thousands, if not hundreds
of thousands, of legitimate asylum seekers who have no hope of reaching western soil.
The fact that it is so difficult to imagine the implementation of such a regime is partly a
reflection of how alien it is to our principles, and partly a reflection of the basic
dilemma that renders the current asylum crisis so difficult to resolve: the battery of
exclusionary measures adopted by Western states are closely related to the asylum
standards the West seeks to maintain.
There is, in the end, a final alternative, namely the status quo. However inadequate in
the face of raw state power, there are national and international constraints on restrictive
asylum legislation. Despite the battery of measures instituted, states have little choice
but to process and accept the majority of asylum seekers reaching, with the aid of the
idealistic and the unscrupulous, their shores. Perhaps the Geneva Convention is
preferable to any conceivable alternative; if it is, however, it is not because its original
provisions and intent are being respected. Reinforcing the status quo requires
acceptance of situation in which many of the most deserving will never reach western
shores; in which the use of traffickers be widespread and increasing and in which the
distinction between migrant and refugee – in some sense the whole point of the
Convention – becomes even more attenuated. This is hardly a glowing endorsement, but
it is perhaps a sufficient one. In making it, however, we should not delude ourselves into
thinking that the asylum crisis can be solved through tinkering. Only dramatic
developments – an unlikely resolution of the economic equality, political instability and
violence that leads to asylum movements – or drastic changes – a major overhaul of the
current asylum system – would move us beyond the impasse.21
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